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Latin America is a volatile, crisis-prone region, with limited and inadequate social 
insurance. Therefore, the long-term as well as the recent poor suffer significantly 
during crises. Furthermore, social spending is procyclical in the region, but less so 
than total spending, indicating that the effectiveness of compensatory social 
policies designed to protect those vulnerable to crises is constrained by 
adjustments during recessions. The causes of procyclical fiscal policy lie in the 
political constraints on saving during expansions, combined with limited 
creditworthiness during recessions, and enhanced by economic volatility and a 
low share of automatic stabilizers in the budget.  
 
We evaluate policy options to reduce procyclicality of fiscal policy, such 
as stabilization funds, fiscal rules and reform of budget institutions, and argue in 
favor of integrated policy proposals based on more country-specific analysis, such 
as the Fiscal Responsibility Law in Brazil. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Following the recent crisis in Argentina, the poverty rate jumped from 35 percent to almost 60 
percent in six months. Devaluation and inflation eroded the purchasing power of wages and 
pensions, and unemployment reached an unprecedented 23 percent. This pushed almost 9 million 
people—twice the population of Norway—below the poverty line. At the same time, government 
spending in real terms contracted by 25 percent in 2002, severely limiting efforts to provide 
assistance to poor families by means of a massive workfare program. This pattern of increased 
poverty, combined with a fiscal adjustment that limits the scope of social policy, is common 
during crises in Latin America.  
Being poor in Latin America is risky. Apart from the idiosyncratic risks faced by 
individuals and families worldwide, including unemployment, illness, or disability, systemic 
shocks such as macroeconomic crises or prolonged recessions are common. Furthermore, these 
crises are usually deeper and more frequent,
2 and hurt the poor more than in rich countries.
3 
Unfortunately, social insurance mechanisms such as unemployment benefits are less developed 
than in OECD countries.
4 To make matters worse, the income distribution in the region is such 
that middle income brackets, the “middle class,” are at great risk of falling into poverty if hit by a 
shock.
5 It is therefore not surprising that according to recent surveys, economic insecurity is a 
major concern for a large segment of the population in Latin America.
6 
In this context of high economic insecurity, combined with inadequate private and social 
insurance mechanisms, a pro-poor government would save resources during good times. These 
savings could then be allocated to social programs during recessions. However, social spending 
is strongly procyclical in Latin America. That is, governments tend to increase pro-poor 
spending during expansions and reduce it during recessions.
7  
                                                           
2 See, for instance, Gavin, Hausmann, Perotti and Talvi (1996), and Gavin and Perotti (1997). 
3 Among other differences, the poor in Latin America tend to have informal jobs with no social protection and less 
access to credit markets so as to smooth the impact of crises; this combination of circumstances puts them at a 
distinct disadvantage compared to the poor in rich countries. See, for instance, Lustig (1999). 
4 See Bourguignon (2000). 
5 See Birdsall (2002) for a discussion. 
6 A 1999 poll of 14,000 Latin Americans in 14 different countries published in the Wall Street Journal and cited by 
Rodrik (1999) shows that 73 percent of respondents answered that they would prefer more spending on 
unemployment insurance, and over 83 percent preferred increased spending on pensions. Rodrik argues that these 
numbers are relevant because only 32 percent answered that they wanted more defense spending, meaning that 
respondents distinguish between economic security and national security.  
7 Wodon, Hicks, Ryan et al. (2002) find that social spending per poor person falls by 2 percent for each 1 percent 
reduction in GDP per capita. 
  5Paradoxically, social spending is procyclical despite the declarations that governments 
and International Financial Institutions (IFIs) have made, especially since the generalization of 
democracy during the past two decades in the region, regarding the importance of protecting the 
poor during recessions. We find that although social spending as a percentage of total spending 
tends to increase during crises, the depth of fiscal adjustment in bad times results in a decline in 
real social spending.  
If fiscal adjustments are constraining the effectiveness of social policy to protect those 
vulnerable during downturns, a major question arises: why is fiscal policy still procyclical in 
Latin America? The Inter-American Development Bank has pioneered research in this area. The 
1997 Economic and Social Progress Report (IDB, 1997) presents evidence that fiscal policy is 
particularly procyclical in Latin America because both the automatic and discretionary responses 
of the budget to the cycle are more procyclical than in rich countries. The automatic response is 
more procyclical because Latin American governments have a smaller proportion of automatic 
stabilizers such as unemployment insurance in their mix. The discretionary response is more 
procyclical because volatility, political constraints and weak institutions make saving during 
good times difficult.
8 Furthermore, limited creditworthiness makes borrowing during recessions 
close to impossible, so governments that were unable to save during good times are forced to 
adjust spending. In fact, targeted social spending is often the victim of cuts, due to the rigidity of 
other budget items such as public sector wages, pensions and debt payments.  
What can governments and IFIs do to limit this problem? Proposals and actual country 
experience provide us with a menu of policy choices to reduce procyclicality of fiscal policy. 
This menu includes among others: 
 
-  Fiscal stabilization funds that would collect surpluses during good times 
which could be spent during recessions 
-  Numerical fiscal rules to limit the growth of spending and debt during 
expansions 
-  Reforms to the structure of federal fiscal transfers so as to reduce the 
procyclicality of sub-national spending.
9  
                                                           
8 See Talvi and Végh (2000), Gavin, Hausmann, Perotti and Talvi (1996), Gavin and Perotti (1997), and Tornell and 
Lane (1999). 
9 For example, making transfers constant, as opposed to linking them to procyclical tax revenues. 
  6-  Increases in the proportion of automatic stabilizers in total spending. 
-  GDP-indexed bonds, which would limit the need for fiscal adjustment during 
recessions by automatically reducing interest payments. 
 
Unfortunately, the evidence shows that in many cases, isolated measures do not work. 
For instance, fiscal rules and stabilization funds in many countries have failed due to unexpected 
shocks and politically motivated non-compliance.
10 Given that many of the above proposals do 
not alter underlying political incentives to increase spending during good times, the mixed results 
are not surprising.  
Based on promising new developments in some countries, such as Brazil’s Fiscal 
Responsibility Law, and on recent research,
11 we advocate an integrated, country-specific 
approach that takes political constraints seriously.  
The plan of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 we introduce the analytical framework 
used for discussing the importance of countercyclical fiscal policy as a requirement for 
protecting the poor during downturns. In Section 3 we document, by surveying the literature and 
by analyzing the data, the cyclical behavior of fiscal policy in Latin America, paying specific 
attention to the behavior of social spending in general, and targeted social spending in particular. 
We show that social spending is procyclical in Latin America, and significantly more so than in 
OECD countries. Furthermore, total spending is more procyclical than social spending, 
suggesting that governments attempt to protect the poor during recessions but are constrained by 
the need for fiscal adjustment. In Section 4 we explore why fiscal policy is procyclical in Latin 
America. In Section 5 we map, using theory and international experience, the available policy 
options to reduce procyclicality of fiscal policy, and we evaluate the relative effectiveness of 
these policy options. We study the applicability of these policy options to the Latin American 
context, paying specific attention to political constraints. Section 6 concludes.  
 
                                                           
10 This will be discussed further below. See Braun and Tommasi (2002) for a discussion of some failures of fiscal 
rules in Latin America. 
11 Spiller and Tommasi (2000) for instance develop an in-depth analysis of the Argentine political system, and use 
the framework to propose incentive-compatible policy proposals. Von Hagen, Perotti and Strauch (1997) propose a 
multi-step process to achieve fiscal sustainability in the EU. 
  72. Why is Countercyclical Fiscal Policy Key Poor During Downturns? 
 
There is abundant literature and country experience showing that economic downturns and crises 
affect the poor significantly. This applies both to the “structurally poor,” those with a low 
permanent income, and to members of middle income brackets at risk of falling into poverty 
during recessions due to loss of employment or other negative shocks to their income. In the rest 
of the paper, when we refer to “the poor” we are referring to both groups, unless otherwise 
specified. Thus, the focus of the paper is more on social insurance than on strict poverty 
alleviation.  
Ferreira, Prenushi and Ravallion (1999), Lustig (1999) and Lustig and Walton (1999) 
survey the channels through which crises affect poverty. They find that crises tend to reduce 
labor demand, change relative prices, and change the rate of return and value of assets. The poor 
are usually less able to cope with these shocks
12 because they a) have limited access to credit 
markets, b) have more informal and unstable jobs, c) do not have diversified assets that they can 
sell to smooth consumption, and d) they may suffer long-term effects from recessions, such as a 
loss of human capital due to the consequences of malnutrition, loss of health, or loss of 
education. 
To improve the welfare of the poor over the long term, sustained economic growth is 
necessary.
13 At the same time, Latin American countries need to find ways to reduce the 
volatility of the poor’s well-being. An integrated approach would include 1) reducing economic 
volatility in the region, 2) increasing the extent of social insurance mechanisms, and 3) 
protecting vulnerable persons from the consequences of crises by means of an adequate safety 
net. According to De Ferranti, Perry, Gill et al. (2000), policies in these three dimensions should 
be designed taking into account the response of individuals to crises in the form of buying 
market insurance, self-insurance (such as savings) and self-protection (engaging in less volatile 
professional activities).
14 
Countercyclical fiscal policy is a key element in all three dimensions of dealing with 
crises. Recent proposals to reduce aggregate macro volatility in Latin America are many, and it 
                                                           
12 De Ferranti, Perry, Gill et al. (2000), however, find however that the poor are hurt more than the rich by long or 
deep downturns, but not during mild recessions.  
13 See Dollar and Kraay (2002) for evidence. 
14 Ferreira, Prenushi and Ravallion (2002) also favor properly calculating who is affected by crises before designing 
responses. 
  8is beyond the scope of this paper to analyze them.
15  However, most of them mention the 
importance of the potential stabilizing role of fiscal policy. Gavin, Hausmann, Perotti and Talvi 
(1996) argue that the procyclicality of fiscal policy in Latin America contributes to economic 
volatility in the region. De Ferranti, Perry, Gill et al. (2000) claim that 15 percent of the excess 
volatility of Latin America vis-à-vis industrial and East Asian countries can be explained by 
fiscal volatility. 
Social insurance requires countercyclical fiscal policy by construction, because it requires 
transferring income from good states to bad states, that is, from booms to recessions. For 
instance, an adequate unemployment insurance scheme would automatically increase 
government expenditure as unemployment increases during a recession, and automatically 
reduce expenditure when employment recovers.  
Finally, regarding protecting the vulnerable from the negative consequences of crises, 
experts and IFIs have recently been proposing the establishment of safety nets. Surveying the 
recent literature on crises and poverty,
16 a consensus regarding the best way to protect the poor 
during downturns seems to be emerging, which can be summarized as follows: 
 
1) Developing  countries  need a safety net to provide insurance for the poor from 
systemic shocks (economic crises) and idiosyncratic shocks (unemployment, 
illness, etc). 
2)  This safety net has a set of desirable characteristics. Among other features 
such as targeting and coverage, safety nets should be countercyclical.
17 For 
this to be feasible, targeted programs should be permanent and based on 
effective, pre-existing institutions, and have the capacity to expand rapidly 
during a crisis and contract automatically when growth resumes.  
3) The programs that seem to conform best to these characteristics are a) 
workfare programs that provide temporary employment at below-market 
wages such as the Trabajar program in Argentina, and b) transfers targeted to 
vulnerable/excluded groups such as Progresa in Mexico or Bolsa Escola in 
Brazil. 
                                                           
15 See De Ferranti, Perry, Gill et al. (2000, Chapter 4) for a full discussion. 
16 De Ferranti, Perry, Gill et al. (2000) presents the results of a collective research effort by World Bank staff and 
academics on the subject. See also Lustig (1999), and Márquez (2000). 
  9 
The cyclical behavior of fiscal policy is a key constraint on establishing a well-funded, 
countercyclical safety net. If government expenditure must be adjusted during a crisis, unless the 
proportion of social spending to total spending increases, then total social spending will fall, 
especially if measured in terms of spending per poor person. 
The focus of this paper is therefore to analyze how fiscal policy in Latin America can 
become countercyclical, and thus contribute to reducing the frequency and depth of downturns, 
establishing an effective social insurance scheme, and developing a fiscally sound and 
countercyclical social safety net.  
To emphasize the importance of countercyclical fiscal policy in establishing an adequate 
safety net, we can decompose, following Wodon, Hicks, Ryan et al. (2002), the cyclical response 
of targeted social spending per poor person into three main components:  
 
1)  Impact of crisis on the number of poor people (the more the crisis increases 
poverty, the harder it will be to increase targeted social spending per poor 
person) 
2) Impact of crisis on fiscal adjustment (the larger the necessary fiscal 
contraction during the crisis, the harder it will be to increase targeted social 
spending per poor person) 
3) Impact of crisis on share of social spending (especially targeted social 
spending) in total spending 
 
In terms of elasticities, the elasticity of targeted social spending per poor person to per 
capita growth is a function of the elasticities of the poverty rate, total spending as a percent of 
GDP, social spending as a percentage of total spending and targeted social spending as a 





































where TSS is targeted social spending, SS is social spending, TS is total spending, N is total 
population, and Np is number of poor people.
18  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
17 See Wodon and Hicks (2000) and De Ferranti, Perry, Gill et al. (2000) for a comprehensive discussion. 
18 This decomposition comes from expressing social spending per poor person as  
  10In this expression, an ideal safety net would be one in which the elasticity of targeted 
social spending per poor person to GDP per capita is at least zero. This would imply that during 
a crisis, targeted social spending per poor person would remain constant, counterbalancing the 
negative effect of the crisis on the increase in the number of poor families.
19 Clearly, a key 
requirement for this is that fiscal policy should be countercyclical; that is, the elasticity of total 
spending to GDP per capita should be negative (and as large as possible). In the next section we 
will show that fiscal policy tends to be actually procyclical in Latin America, thus leading to 
higher economic volatility and acting as a constraint on the possibility of establishing an 
adequate safety net. 
With this in mind, policy should aim at 1) reducing the impact of crises on poverty, 2) 
limiting the need for fiscal adjustment during crises, and 3) ideally increasing—and at least 
protecting—social spending during crises. In Table 1 we present a sample of policy alternatives 
that have been proposed to confront these challenges. 
 













= , applying logs, first differences, and rearranging. 
19 This would imply that programs on average keep their benefits constant, but increase their coverage. It could be 
argued that during a crisis, some programs should increase their benefits. In this case, the elasticity of targeted social 
spending per poor person would be negative. 
  11Table 1. Policy Challenges in Establishing a Countercyclical Safety Net 
 
Issue Policy 
Reduce impact of 
crisis on poor 
Make crises less deep 
-  International portfolio diversification 
-  hedge terms of trade shocks (e.g., commodity 
stabilization funds) 
- Contingent  credit  lines 
- Liquidity  hoarding 
-  Capital controls (e.g., Chile) 
Improve domestic credit markets, especially options for the poor 
(e.g., microcredit) or unemployed (consumer credit usually 
requires a wage certificate). 
Improve income distribution to limit the number of people falling 




Increase the role of automatic stabilizers in the budget 
Improve access to international credit during downturns (e.g., 
contingent funds, countercyclical IFI lending) 
Fiscal Stabilization funds 
GDP-indexed bonds 
Fiscal rules 




Establish an adequate safety net (as described above) 
Earmarking social spending to relatively stable tax revenues such 
as property taxes. 
Protect specific pro-poor budget items from cuts ex-ante. 
Empower the poor to defend social programs during crises 
 
 
  The recent literature on crises and on poverty has widely discussed options to reduce the 
volatility of Latin American economies, and the design of adequate safety nets. However, not 
much emphasis has been placed on studying specific ways of reducing the procyclical behavior 
of fiscal policy. As we saw above, achieving countercyclical fiscal policy is a key element of 
both reducing volatility and protecting the poor during crises. Therefore in this paper we focus 
mainly on the fiscal policy options (row 2 above) and discuss the design of social safety nets to 
the extent that they address the cyclical behavior of fiscal policy. 
The bottom line is that if fiscal policy is procyclical, even though governments make 
efforts to protect social spending within the budget, total social spending in real terms will 
probably decline during downturns. Therefore, procyclical fiscal policy is a constraint on good 
social policy that needs to be overcome if the poor are to be protected. 
  12In the next sections we show that social spending in Latin America is in fact procyclical, 
but less so than total spending. This indicates that in relative terms, the poor are protected during 
recessions, but efforts are limited by the need for fiscal adjustment. 
 
3. The Evidence: Social Spending in Latin America is Procyclical 
 
As argued above, one would think that in Latin America, a crisis-prone region with relatively 
low levels of social insurance, spending on social services and employment programs should 
increase when economic conditions worsen. However, the opposite is true. For example, Hicks 
and Wodon (2000) show that in both Argentina and Mexico the share of targeted social spending 
to GDP fell in the aftermath of the Tequila crisis. Furthermore, as poverty increased, targeted 
social spending per poor person fell by 27.9 percent in Argentina and by 23.7 percent in Mexico. 
Why does this happen? What can be done about it? We address the first question in the next two 
sections, and the second question in the rest of the paper.  
To document the procyclical behavior of social policy in Latin America, as compared to 
OECD countries, we use the Hodrick-Prescott filter
20 to obtain the cyclical component of GDP 
and different components of total spending. With these calculations, we proceed to estimate the 
cyclical behavior of public spending in general and social spending in particular in Latin 
America, and we compare this behavior with that of OECD countries.
21 We show, consistent 
with previous literature,
22 that volatility is highly correlated with procyclical fiscal policy. 
Furthermore, we find evidence that social spending is actually less procyclical than total 
spending. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that the poor are relatively protected 
during crises, but that efforts are limited by the need to adjust spending during downturns. This 
finding is also consistent with Wodon, Hicks, Ryan et al. (2002), who find that governments in 
seven Latin American countries are pro-poor but short-sighted, in that social spending tends to 
increase rapidly during expansions; during contractions, however, “a one percentage point 
decrease in GDP reduces targeted public spending per poor person by two percentage points.” 
They find that half of this reduction is due to the increase in the number of poor, but the other 
                                                           
20 Martner (1999) discusses different estimation techniques for potential GDP and fiscal variables, and argues in 
favor of using the H-P filter for Latin America.   
21 See Appendix A for details on calculations. 
22 See Talvi and Végh (2000) and Gavin, Hausmann, Perotti and Talvi (1996). 
  13half can be attributed to a decline in GDP, which reduces spending even though the share of 
targeted social spending to GDP remains constant. 
In Table 2 we present the results for the correlation between the cyclical component of a) 
total expenditure and b) social expenditure with the cyclical component of GDP in Latin 
America and OECD countries. 
 
Table 2. Cyclical Behavior of Total and Social Spending, 













Costa Rica 0.72 0.75



































United Kingdom -0.47 -0.65




  14The two main conclusions from Table 2 are 1) that social expenditure and total 
expenditure are more procyclical in Latin America than in OECD countries and 2) that in Latin 
America, social expenditure appears less procyclical than total expenditure. 
  Gavin, Hausmann, Perotti and Talvi (1996), Talvi and Végh (2000) and Gavin and Perotti 
(1997) argue that volatility is a key determinant of procyclicality of fiscal policy. In Figure 1 we 
show a plot of the cyclical correlation of fiscal policy and GDP volatility for a sample of 88 
countries for which data was available (see Appendix B for details). The results confirm the 
correlation between the two variables in the data found in previous studies. 
 
Figure 1. Procyclicality and Volatility 
World data (OECD, LA and rest)
Volatility of GDP
 Total expend. procyclicality  Fitted values


























































































   
It is also worth noting that OECD countries tend to have both low volatility and low 
procyclicality of fiscal policy, whereas the reverse is true for Latin America. 
  The positive correlation between volatility and procyclicality also holds within groups of 
countries. Figure 2 presents the plot for Latin American countries. Similar results (not reported) 
can be found for OECD countries. 
  15Figure 2. Procyclicality and Volatility in Latin America 
Latin America
Volatility of GDP
 Total expend. procyclicality  Fitted values

























As shown above, social spending is also procyclical in Latin America. Furthermore, the 
degree of procyclicality of social policy is closely correlated with procyclicality of fiscal policy. 
We regressed the cyclical correlation of social spending on the cyclical correlation of total 
spending, volatility, GDP per capita, size of government, share of income tax revenue in total 
revenue and regional dummies.
23 (See Appendix B for details). The results show a partial 
correlation of 0.54, significant at the 99 percent level, between the cyclical correlations of social 
spending and total spending.  
Volatility was also positively correlated with procyclicality, although the coefficient was 
statistically significant at the 94 percent level. This is consistent with the hypotheses presented 
by Talvi and Végh (2000) and Gavin, Hausmann, Perotti and Talvi (1996). It is worth noting that 
the regional dummies were not significant, meaning that the differences between Latin America 
                                                           
23 We control for volatility following the literature that argues that volatility is an important determinant of 
procyclicality, such as Talvi and Végh (2000). GDP per capita controls for the possibility that the overall level of 
development of a country leads to improved fiscal management. Size of government is included following Rodrik 
(1998), who argues that countries might increase the size of their governments to protect them from greater 
economic risk. Finally, we include the share of income tax revenue to control for possible differences in tax base 
leading to differences in the procyclicality of revenues due to different income elasticities. 
  16and OECD countries in the procyclicality of social spending can be explained by the differences 
in the behavior of overall fiscal policy. 
  In Figure 3 we present the fitted values of the correlation between procyclicality of social 
and total spending and GDP volatility, for the whole sample and for Latin America only. The 
data show once again that social spending tends to be less procyclical than total spending, but 
that both are affected similarly by economic volatility.  
 




 Total expend. procycl (fitted)  Social expend. procycl (fitted)







World data (OECD, LA and rest)
Volatility of GDP
 Total expend. procycl (fitted)  Social expend. procycl (fitted)







  17Our reading of the evidence presented so far is as follows. Latin American countries face 
high economic volatility, which contributes to procyclicality of total spending. The need for 
fiscal adjustment during recessions (possibly due to limited creditworthiness) forces a reduction 
in total spending during bad times.
24 Social spending is also reduced, but proportionately less 
than other items of spending. This suggests that countries in Latin America attempt to protect the 
poor during recessions, but are limited in their efforts by the need for fiscal adjustment. In terms 
of the framework presented in the previous section, our results suggest that to improve the 
reaction of social spending per poor person during crises, it is key to reduce economic volatility 
and procyclicality of total spending in Latin America. Protecting specific items of social 
spending during crises is helpful, but evidently limited in scope.  
The bottom line then is that in terms of fiscal policy, the key to reducing procyclicality of 
social spending in Latin America is reducing the procyclicality of total spending. Less 
procyclical fiscal policy will also reduce economic volatility. In the next section we attempt to 
understand why fiscal policy is procyclical in Latin America, doing so in order to provide a basis 
for proposing specific reforms. 
 
4. Why is Fiscal Policy Procyclical in Latin America?  
 
As discussed above, it is unlikely that a country will be able to increase social spending per poor 
family in a recession if it is forced to cut total spending. Therefore, countries in Latin America 
must strive to achieve the capacity to carry out countercyclical fiscal policy. In the words of 
Birdsall (2002), these countries will require “brilliant fiscal management” if they want to 
implement a pro-poor social contract. In this section, we discuss the possible causes of 
procyclical fiscal policy, before analyzing in the next section the different policy options to 
reduce the need for fiscal adjustment during times of recession and crisis.  
In a theoretical paper that seeks to explain this phenomenon, Talvi and Végh (2000) argue 
that procyclicality of fiscal policy arises from the inability of governments to accumulate fiscal 
surpluses during good times because of political pressures to overspend. They assume that political 
pressures to spend are an increasing (and convex) function of the budget surplus. This assumption, 
embedded in a Lucas and Stokey (1983) type model of optimal fiscal policy, yields the result that 
                                                           
24 This behavior contrasts with developed country experience. Recent studies such as Arreaza, Sorensen and Yosha 
(1998) and Lane (1999) find a positive correlation between output shocks and the government budget surplus in OECD 
  18higher volatility of output leads to more procyclical fiscal policy. The reason is that volatility of 
output leads to larger surpluses in good times, and thus invites higher pressures to overspend. The 
optimal policy for a benevolent social planner in this context is to reduce tax rates during booms so 
as to reduce overspending. This policy response to the inability of saving during good times leads to 
more procyclical fiscal policy in countries with higher volatility, and can thus explain why 
developing countries, which have more volatile output, face more procyclical fiscal policy than 
OECD countries.  
An alternative explanation discussed by Velasco (1999) and Tornell and Lane (1999) is the 
possibility that developing countries and OECD countries might differ in the extent to which they 
suffer from political pressures to overspend in good times due to common pool problems in the 
allocation of fiscal resources. The argument is that in developing countries, fiscal resources are like 
a “common pool” from which powerful interest groups try to extract the largest possible share. 
When tax revenues increase, each group finds it individually rational to push for a larger portion, 
because all the other groups are doing this. If a group does not push for a larger share, it will still 
suffer the macro consequences of overspending, because all the rest increase their claims, together 
with a loss in relative power. The difference between developed and developing countries is then in 
the extent to which fiscal resources are a common pool, and the extent to which the demands of 
powerful groups can be effectively limited by political institutions and the budget process.  
Regarding Latin America, Gavin, Hausmann, Perotti and Talvi (1996) argue that procyclical 
fiscal policy is part of a vicious cycle of volatility, procyclicality and limited creditworthiness. 
Political pressures make saving during good times difficult. This problem is enhanced by volatility, 
because larger surpluses are harder to save. When a recession hits, creditors are unwilling to finance 
a fiscal deficit because they fear default. This limited creditworthiness during recessions, combined 
with lack of savings during good times, make fiscal adjustments during recessions inevitable. At the 
same time, expansive fiscal policy during expansions and fiscal adjustments during recessions 
contribute to economic volatility, closing the vicious cycle. Fatás and Mihov (2002) find evidence 
consistent with this hypothesis. They show that greater discretion in fiscal policy contributes to 
higher economic volatility in a sample of 51 countries. 
Stein, Talvi and Grisanti (1997) find that Latin American countries with a larger district 
magnitude, which is related to a more proportional electoral system, tend to run more procyclical 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
countries.  
  19fiscal policy. They argue that this evidence is consistent with the arguments above, in that larger 
district magnitudes may deliver weaker governments, less able to resist spending pressures during 
good times.  
It is not easy to disentangle the causality and the relative importance of the competing 
explanatory factors of procyclicality. However, differences in Latin American and OECD 
governments discussed in the recent literature can help understand the causes of procyclical fiscal 
policy in Latin America. 
Summing up, fiscal policy is probably more procyclical in Latin America because: 
a)  The automatic response of fiscal policy is less countercyclical than in the 
OECD
25 because Latin America has 
- Smaller  governments 
-  Smaller proportion of automatic stabilizers in public spending (for 
instance, very limited unemployment insurance) 
b) The discretionary response of fiscal policy (especially spending) is more 
procyclical than in OECD because 
-  high volatility, higher discretionality, political constraints and weak 
fiscal institutions make saving in good times harder 
-  limited creditworthiness (with lack of savings in good times) forces 
adjustment in bad times 
 
The discussion above suggests working in the direction of increasing the role of 
automatic stabilizers in the budget—as long as this can be done along a sustainable fiscal path—
developing financial instruments to improve access to credit during recessions, and 
implementing fiscal institutions that limit discretionary spending and pressures to increase 
spending during good times. These topics will be discussed in the next section. 
 
5. What Can (and Do) Countries Do about Procyclical Fiscal Policy?  
 
We have seen that fiscal policy in Latin America is procyclical due to the low proportion of 
automatic stabilizers in the budget, due to political and institutional limits to fiscal savings 
                                                           
25 Martner (1999) estimates that the average elasticity of the cyclical surplus to growth is of 0.2 percent of GDP in 
Latin America, compared with estimates closer to 0.5 percent of GDP in the EU. 
  20during expansions, and due to limited creditworthiness during recessions. In this section we 
explore policy options to improve the performance of Latin American countries along these three 
dimensions. 
 
Increasing the Size of Automatic Stabilizers 
 
The first issue, increasing the size of automatic stabilizers, is not a simple task. Bourguignon 
(2000) shows that Latin America’s “welfare state” is similar in size and scope to that of Europe 
in the 1920s and 1930s. Excluding spending on education, Latin American countries spend on 
average 10 percent of GDP on social protection, compared to 15 to 33 percent in rich countries.
26 
It took Europe several decades of post-war economic growth to develop its current welfare state 
institutions. Rodrik (1998) argues that more open economies tend to have larger governments 
because of the role that government spending has in stabilizing income. As Latin America is an 
increasingly open, shock-prone region, we should expect the region to increase the proportion of 
public spending to GDP, and at the same time, increase the participation of automatic stabilizers 
in the budget, thus contributing to making fiscal policy more countercyclical.  
  In fact, some of this has happened already. Castañeda (2002) shows that the share of 
social spending in GDP in Latin America remained stable during the 1970s and 1980s, but 
increased during the 1990s, primarily due to the increase in social security spending. He also 
describes the institutional innovations over the past 30 years, such as increased decentralization, 
the recent growth in conditional transfer programs, and a growing interest in improving 
monitoring and evaluation of social policy. However, there are important limits to this direction, 
and clearly it is not a short-term option due to current fiscal constraints in the region.  
Furthermore, given the large size of the informal sector in Latin American economies, it 
is not easy to fund and control unemployment insurance effectively.
27 In addition, Alesina (1999) 
argues that developing countries such as those in Latin America are caught in an equilibrium of 
inefficiently low size of government due to low quality of public goods and high tax evasion. 
Citizens do not want to pay taxes for which they do not see a return, and tax evasion in turn 
limits government capacity. Alt, Lassen and Skilling (2001) find evidence consistent with this 
hypothesis. They explore the effect of transparency of fiscal institutions on the scale of 
                                                           
26 The conclusion is unchanged if we exclude pensions. Latin American average social spending, excluding 
education and pensions, is 4.8 percent of GDP, compared with a range of 9.4 percent (United States) to 24 percent 
(Sweden) in OECD countries. 
  21government and gubernatorial popularity in US States between 1986 and 1995. They conclude 
“fiscal transparency increases both the scale of government and gubernatorial popularity. The 
results […] imply that more transparent budget institutions induce greater effort by politicians, to 
which voters give higher job approval, on average. Voters also respond by entrusting greater 
resources to politicians where institutions are more transparent, leading to larger size of 
government.” This suggests that efforts to improve the efficiency of the public sector, improve 
transparency in the budget and fight tax evasion should be promoted by IFIs. The objective 
should be helping Latin American countries to “switch” towards a better equilibrium with 
improved social protection and lower tax evasion. However, results will probably not be 
forthcoming immediately. 
 
Increasing Savings during Good Times 
 
In the previous section, we presented arguments showing that procyclical fiscal policy is caused 
by the lack of fiscal savings during economic expansions. The causes identified in the literature 
are a combination of volatility and politico-institutional constraints. The stylized argument is that 
powerful groups struggle for shares of the common pool of fiscal resources. These groups are 
unwilling to sacrifice their part when resources increase in favor of future savings, because they 
are unsure that they will receive their fair share. This struggle generates pressure for increased 
spending during good times. Furthermore, the pressure is greater the larger the fiscal surpluses. 
Therefore, volatility, which generates large surpluses in booms and large deficits in recessions, 
makes savings during good times even harder.  
  The conclusion of this analysis is that Latin American countries intent on increasing 
spending should 1) reduce economic volatility, and 2) identify the specific causes of political 
pressures for overspending in good times, and implement the reforms necessary to limit these 
pressures, or at least effectively channel them. As mentioned before, it is beyond the scope of 
this paper to discuss ways, other than making fiscal policy less procyclical, of reducing economic 
volatility. We will therefore focus on reforms that could limit political pressures to overspend 
during good times. 
  Traditional proposals in this direction can be divided into four categories: 1) fiscal rules, 
2) stabilization funds, 3) reform of fiscal institutions, and 4) reform of political institutions.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
27 See Márquez (2000) for a discussion of employment protection policies in Latin America. 
  22Fiscal rules are an intuitively attractive solution to problems of overspending. Under 
perfect enforcement, a well-designed rule—for instance, one that puts a cap on total spending, or 
mandates a structural surplus—could automatically solve the problem. It is therefore not 
surprising that economists, well trained in principal-agent analysis, have generated a slew of 
proposals for fiscal rules of a different nature.
28 A good example is the structural surplus (1 
percent) rule implemented in Chile (see Appendix C for details) that allows for limited deficits 
during recessions. 
However, perfect enforcement is rarely the environment in which fiscal rules are applied. 
For example, it is not clear that central governments in federal countries have the power to 
credibly enforce sub-national fiscal rules. In Box 1 we survey recent Latin American experiences 
with fiscal rules. We find that the results are not promising, with two severe episodes of non-
compliance in Peru and Argentina. We will discuss the shortcomings of fiscal rules in more 
detail below. 
 
                                                           
28 See Kopits and Symansky (1998) for a survey. It is worth noting that some of the most common fiscal rules, such 
as balanced budget amendments in US states, were not designed to reduce procyclicality of spending, but rather to 
achieve fiscal discipline. In fact, some of these rules can actually increase procyclicality. (See for instance, Bayoumi 
and Eichengreen, 1995). The argument is that fiscal rules, especially balanced-budget amendments, do not allow 
borrowing during recessions and thus limit the ability of governments to run countercyclical fiscal policy. However, 
these rules are usually discussed in the context of countries (or states) with a structural fiscal surplus. Tanner (2003) 
presents a model in which rules that contribute to fiscal solvency can at the same time reduce procyclicality. 
  23Box 1.  Recent Fiscal Rules in Latin America 
 
Can fiscal rules be the solution to fiscal insolvency and procyclicality of spending? During the last part of the 1990s 
some Latin American countries, in some cases at the behest of IFIs, have started to implement fiscal rules. This 
move has received increasing attention from economists and policymakers. Alesina, Hausmann, Hommes and Stein 
(1999) created an index of fiscal institutions that included a component measuring the existence of fiscal rules 
limiting the level of debt. They found that the index was negatively correlated with fiscal deficits in a sample of 
Latin American countries. The study also suggests that transparency clauses and well-structured budget procedures 
can contribute to fiscal prudence.  
  However, there is a potential problem with endogeneity in this kind of study, since it is plausible that the 
countries with better budget institutions and fiscal outcomes are countries in which voters prefer fiscal prudence. 
Therefore, performing an adequate econometric study in order to measure the impact of fiscal rules on fiscal 
outcomes is not an easy task. Braun and Tommasi (2002) argue that evidence is not yet conclusive regarding the 
effectiveness of fiscal rules as limits on fiscal profligacy. In this box we present descriptive evidence from five Latin 
American countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru. All of these countries have implemented different 
kinds of fiscal rules during the 1990s. These examples should not be construed as presenting conclusive evidence, 
but can illustrate the potential benefits and shortfalls of fiscal rules, particularly in Latin American countries. (See 
Appendix C for more details). 
  We find two episodes, Argentina and Peru, of definite non-compliance with the rule. In other cases, such as 
Chile and Brazil, the experience looks promising but it is still too early to make a conclusion about the impact of 
fiscal rules. The countries have not gone through circumstances that really tested the commitment to comply with 
the fiscal rule. In fact, in the case of Brazil, pressures seem to be mounting on Lula from provincial governors to 
relax the Fiscal Responsibility Law. A point worth noting is that Chile has a longer tradition of fiscal prudence, so it 
is harder to argue that good fiscal outcomes are the consequence of a new fiscal rule. 
 
Argentina: Fiscal Solvency Law 
  Faced with a deteriorating budget balance and growing debt payments, the Argentine Congress approved a 
Fiscal Solvency Law in September 1999. Apart from establishing numerical limits for the central government’s 
fiscal deficit, it also limited the growth of expenditures. Furthermore, the law stipulated the adoption of a three-year 
budget, the creation of a counter-cyclical Fiscal Fund, and the implementation of transparency measures to increase 
the availability of information regarding the state of public finances. However, the deficit limits were not respected 
in any year between 1999 and 2001. (See Appendix C for details).  
  Several sub-national governments followed the national example and passed fiscal solvency rules. These 
rules differ across provinces in some of their characteristics, as well as in the degree to which they have been 
adhered to. In fact, only five provinces out of eleven with hard limits on deficits complied in 2000.  
 
Brazil: Fiscal Responsibility Law 
  In the 1980s, inconsistent fiscal and monetary management and coordination, despite the start of some 
economic reforms, caused a volatile environment and several crises. During the 1990s there were also several crises; 
in many cases, the federal government bailed out the states out, furthering the incentives for fiscal laxity at the local 
level. 
  In 1998 a new round of rescheduling was accompanied by attempts at hardening state budget constraints. 
Fiscal targets were placed in budgetary laws. And rules limiting debt were established. Not all of these rules were 
effective. Therefore, the government sent to Congress a Fiscal Responsibility Law, which was approved with full 
majority support in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.  
  The Brazilian Fiscal Responsibility Law applies to the three levels of government and encompasses the 
judiciary, legislative and executive branches. This law includes rules concerning revenue, expenditure and debt 
targets, as well as limits for personnel expenditures and government debt. The law establishes that tax exemptions or 
benefits and new expenditures must be included in the budget law. The law also includes provisions to increase 
transparency of fiscal information. Furthermore, the law contemplates sanctions both at the institutional and 
individual level.  
  The preliminary results are encouraging. However, it is too early to come to a conclusion about the long-
term effects on public finances in Brazil. It has not yet been tested by time, and the change in government at the 
national level is too recent to evaluate its effects. 
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Chile: The New Fiscal Rule 
  In 1985 the government created the Chilean Copper Fund to help stabilize fiscal revenues from the 
volatility of copper prices. Thanks to this policy, government expenditures have not closely tracked revenue 
availability. Nevertheless, the Fund has played a limited role in helping to execute countercyclical policies in 
downturns.  
  In 1999, after the structural balance showed a deficit for the first time in ten years, the government decided 
to implement a new approach to fiscal policy. At that time a new fiscal rule based on a structural surplus of 1 percent 
of GDP was introduced to reaffirm and intensify Chile’s commitment to fiscal responsibility. This does not qualify 
as a fiscal rule in the stricter sense, as it is only a self-imposed measure by the present government to guide fiscal 
policy. Something to highlight is that this new fiscal policy approach represents not an emergency effort to restore 
fiscal policy credibility, but to set a sign of how fiscal policy will be conducted over the medium term. As in the 
case of Brazil, Chile’s new fiscal rule has not yet been tested by time.   
 
Colombia: Fiscal Responsibility Rule 
  As a way to increase control over sub-national debt by the central government, the so-called Traffic Light 
Law was passed in 1997. This law brought into effect a rating system for territorial governments. However, this law 
has not been fully effective in limiting the behavior of sub-national governments in terms of debt. During the 1980s 
and 1990s, the government created two stabilization funds, the Colombian Coffee Fund and the Colombian Oil 
Stabilization Fund. Their objective was to help stabilize fiscal policy. Both funds, however, turned out to be less 
important than expected in terms of meeting their objectives.  
  Therefore, in 2000, as part of necessary reforms the Colombian government passed the Sub-National Fiscal 
Responsibility Law. This law includes limits on expenditures and how they should be financed. It also establishes 
that sub-national governments that do not comply with the limits imposed by the law, must adopt a fiscal rescue 
program to regain viability within the next two years. In addition, the law promotes transparency through an 
extensive list of characteristics and requirements for the election of governors, mayors, legislators and their 
relatives. In this case, it is also too early to tell whether the law has brought about a structural change in fiscal 
outcomes, but the provisions seem to be a move in the right direction. 
 
Peru: Prudence and Transparency Law    
  During most of the 1990s, the main objective of fiscal policy was to generate primary surpluses in order to 
afford interest payments of the non-financial public sector debt. At the end of this decade fiscal balances showed 
both an apparent ceiling for revenue collection and increasing public expenditures. By the end of 1999, Congress 
approved a Prudence and Transparency Law with the goal of establishing guidelines to improve public finance 
management in order to contribute to economic stability.  
  This law includes numerical limits to the public sector deficit, the rate of increase of expenditures and the 
public debt. It also establishes a Multi-annual Macroeconomic Framework, which contains macroeconomic and 
fiscal projections for the next three years. In addition, it creates a Fiscal Stabilization Fund managed by the Ministry 
of Economy and Finance. 
  The numerical and exception rules set by the law were completely impossible to comply with during recent 
downturns. In 2000, the non-financial public sector deficit amounted to 3.2 percent of GDP and to 2.5 percent in 
2001. This completely violated the exception rule that establishes a maximum 2 percent deficit during recessions.            
  25A potential problem with rules that call for surpluses during good times is what to do 
with the surpluses to limit pressures for spending them. One option is to force the government to 
use the surplus for debt reduction. Another popular alternative is to place surpluses in a fiscal 
stabilization fund (see, for example, the provisions in the fiscal responsibility laws of Argentina 
and Peru).  
This brings us to the second class of proposals. Stabilization funds are often championed 
as an option for accumulating savings during good times. In many cases, these funds are 
associated with revenues linked to commodities, such as Chile’s Copper Stabilization Fund. 
However, in countries with strong pressures to spend, and high levels of poverty and inequality, 
the surpluses in these funds might be difficult to sustain politically during good times. 
Furthermore, recent evidence regarding commodity stabilization funds shows that they present 
several potential problems. Davis, Ossowski, Daniel et al. (2001) argue that, among other 
problems, oil funds are not effective in stabilizing oil revenue, because the international price of 
oil does not appear to have a constant average. Therefore, it is difficult to distinguish between 
permanent and temporary changes in prices, and thus difficult to establish a sustainable rule for 
accumulating and spending the resources in the oil fund. They found evidence for a sample of 12 
countries producing nonrenewable resources, of which five had stabilization funds, that public 
spending both in countries with and without funds usually followed commodity export earnings.  
  A deeper problem with fiscal rules and stabilization funds discussed in Braun and 
Tommasi (2002) is that it is not obvious ex ante why a rule or a fund will change political 
incentives to overspend in countries accustomed to not complying with laws and abruptly 
changing policy regimes. Perry (2002) argues that fiscal rules can contribute to saving during 
good times by increasing the marginal political cost of higher saving, and by giving more power 
to a prudent finance minister vis-à-vis spending ministers. Milesi-Ferretti,  (2000) however, 
argues that in countries with lower levels of budget transparency, fiscal rules can actually lead to 
more creative accounting instead of better outcomes. Governments may find it easier to fudge 
the numbers than to actually limit spending. He cites examples of creative accounting in France, 
Italy and Greece in the run-up to EMU in which fiscal outcomes were “improved” by up to 1 
percent of GDP. The evidence presented in Braun and Tommasi (2002) and the cases of rule 
non-compliance we cite in Box 1 and Appendix C should warn us against being overly optimistic 
regarding the effectiveness of rules to limit procyclicality.  
  26These problems, combined with recent evidence on the importance of fiscal and political 
institutions on budget outcomes leads many analysts to favor proposals to reform fiscal 
institutions such as budget procedures and intergovernmental tax-sharing regimes. Some even go 
further and propose changing political institutions such as electoral rules. 
Regarding fiscal institutions, the argument is that budget procedures, the structure of 
intergovernmental tax sharing schemes, and other institutional characteristics of the fiscal 
framework of a country can influence the incentives that the “players” in the fiscal game have 
over the cycle. Underlying the argument in Perry (2002) for instance, is the notion that more 
hierarchical budget procedures—that give more power to the Executive vis-à-vis the legislature 
and the Finance minister vis-a-vis the spending ministers—can contribute to limiting spending 
during booms. The idea is that the executive and the finance minister internalize the 
intertemporal government budget constraint more than other ministers and the legislature, that 
are more worried about securing a portion of the budget for their ministry or region.  
Although we share the view that incentives in the budget process are probably a key 
element in determining the extent of overspending during good times, as with fiscal rules, a 
linear application of general principles seems unwarranted given the current state of knowledge. 
Stein, Talvi and Grisanti (1997), for instance, find that budget procedures, measured by the same 
index described in Alesina, Hausmann, Hommes and Stein (1999), are not correlated with the 
behavior of fiscal policy over the cycle in Latin America. This suggests the need for more 
detailed, country-specific analysis, to understand what types of reform to the budget process 
would be most effective in different contexts.  
With regard to federal fiscal arrangements, there is increasing evidence that these might 
be a key factor in understanding the procyclical behavior of fiscal policy in general and social 
policy in particular. We illustrate this point in Box 2, where we discuss the tax-sharing regime in 
Argentina and the cyclical behavior of expenditure at different levels of government. 
  27Box 2. Federalism and Procyclical Spending in Argentina 
 
As shown in Section 3, Argentina has one of the highest levels of procyclicality of total and social expenditure in 
Latin America. Probably part of this can be explained by the incentives created by federal fiscal arrangements in the 
country. Argentina has highly centralized tax collection but very decentralized spending. Social spending is 
particularly decentralized, given that most of the responsibility for health and education expenditures are at the local 
level. 
Furthermore, Piffano, Sanguinetti and Zentner (1998) show that federal government taxes are more 
income-elastic than taxes collected by sub-national governments. This, together with the fact that most transfers to 
provinces are automatic, leads to highly procyclical revenues for provinces. Given that provinces have incentives to 
abuse the common resource of public credit, they often spend more (and even increase debt) when they receive more 
transfers. A history of bailouts by the central government (see Nicolini, Posadas, Sanguinetti et al., 1999) further 
erodes incentives for sub-national fiscal prudence during good times. (See Tommasi, Jones and Sanguinett, 1999, for 
a more comprehensive discussion of the problems of Argentine federalism). 
The result, of course, is highly procyclical spending. Below we report correlation matrices for the cyclical 
components of total and social expenditure by level of government and output. Provincial spending is significantly 




1- Cycle GDP per capita 1.00            
2- Cycle Total Expenditures Level: National 0.35             1.00            
3- Cycle Total Expenditures Level: Subnational 0.55             0.42             1.00            




1- Cycle GDP per capita 1.00            
2- Cycle Social Expenditures Level: National 0.31             1.00            
3- Cycle Social Expenditures Level: Subnational 0.51             0.80             1.00            
4- Cycle Social Expenditures Level: Municipal 0.36             0.89             0.88             1.00              
 
Clearly, to reduce procyclicality in Argentina, a key element will be dealing with the perverse incentives 
created by the current tax-sharing regime. 
 
Webb, González and Rosenblatt (2002) discuss the possibility of implementing sub-
national stabilizing transfers as a way to deal with procyclicality in federal countries. As shown 
in Box 2 for the Argentine case, transfers to sub-national governments are potentially 
destabilizing. The reason is that they are positively correlated with procyclical tax revenues and 
can therefore induce procyclical spending at the local level if provinces do not internalize the 
importance of sound macroeconomic policy. Webb, González and Rosenblatt further propose 
transfers not tied to tax revenues, such as fixed transfers over the cycle. The argument in favor of 
these transfers is that they could potentially reduce the inherent procyclicality of spending by 
limiting the available funds for sub-national spending during booms (that tend to be spent on 
inflexible items such as wages) and reducing the need for adjustment in bad times. 
  28Although the experience with stabilizing transfers is recent and limited, the authors find 
no clear evidence that these helped in Argentina and Colombia where they were implemented, 
vis-à-vis Mexico and Brazil. This does not imply that reforming federal fiscal arrangements is 
ineffective for reducing procyclicality of fiscal policy. It does, however, imply that more care 
should be taken in the design of proposed reforms. 
Other proposals include limiting sub-national borrowing via borrowing rules (especially 
prohibiting using future transfers from the central government as collateral), forbidding 
borrowing from the domestic financial sector (one way to do this is by increasing the risk 
evaluation that the Central Bank places on lending to sub-national governments by banks), 
decouple sub-national transfers from procyclical revenues, and even punishing local officials 
with jail time or fines if they exceed fiscal limits. The Fiscal Responsibility Law in Brazil is an 
interesting case that includes several of these features, but as was mentioned before, it is still too 
early to evaluate the effectiveness of the rule. 
Finally, results such as those in Stein, Talvi and Grisanti (1997) open the possibility of 
discussing reform of political institutions, such as electoral laws, as an avenue to improve fiscal 
outcomes. As mentioned above, they find that Latin American countries with a larger district 
magnitude tend to run more procyclical fiscal policy. However, their coefficients have limited 
statistical significance. In addition, political institutions probably affect many other dimensions of 
public policy, so it is not clear that a change is desirable solely for fiscal reasons. Finally, political 
institutions significantly influence who “wins” the political game and are therefore very hard to 
reform. We believe that a potentially more productive avenue is to design proposals for fiscal rules 
and reform of fiscal institutions looking in detail at the politics of each country. (See Box 3 for more 
detail, Braun and Tommasi, 2002, for a discussion of this approach regarding fiscal rules, and Stein 
and Tommasi, 2002, for a framework to study these issues across countries.) 
  
  29Box 3. Political Leadership as a Requirement for “Brilliant Fiscal Management” 
 
The kind of reforms required to effectively change fiscal policy outcomes might appear daunting. Increasing the size 
of automatic stabilizers is a long-term effort that required several decades to develop in Europe. On the other hand, 
reforming the budget process, improving federal fiscal arrangements and implementing credible and flexible fiscal 
rules require difficult political compromises that generate payoffs in the future. It is therefore not easy for 
governments in Latin America to focus on these issues. 
However, the recent experience with fiscal management in Chile, together with the implementation of the 
Fiscal Responsibility Law in Brazil, can provide hope, good examples and useful lessons. For example, the central 
government in Brazil took advantage of the negotiating power it gained from offering to take over the States’ debts 
to pass a reform that appears to be limiting sub-national spending and debt. Reform-minded governments should 
seize these opportunities to negotiate sustainable reforms that can reduce the procyclical behavior of spending. The 
case of Chile highlights the value of building a reputation for prudent fiscal behavior. 
Braun and Tommasi (2002)—based on previous work “crystallized”
29 in Spiller and Tommasi (2000)—
present an application of the country-specific approach to policy design for sub-national fiscal rules in Argentina. 
Although the proposals are not exclusively aimed at reducing procyclicality, we believe they provide a flavor for the 
proposed approach. The determinants of poor sub-national fiscal behavior have been diagnosed as i) large vertical 
fiscal imbalances, ii) a tax-sharing regime with little incentive to raise taxes locally, iii) several bail-out channels 
from the national government to the provinces, iv) several political motives why the federal government might be 
willing to bail out provinces, and v) a lack of enforcement of intergovernmental agreements. This suggests a general 
strategy, which should include the following measures: 
 
1.  Reforms of the electoral mechanisms to lower the dependency of national legislators on local party elites (as the 
analysis of the previous section suggests, the weakness of national legislators is one key aspect of the poor 
transactions environment). 
2.  Reforms of the instruments of legislative interaction between the President and Congress (this could improve 
the possibility of enforcing, and hence of achieving in the first place, more efficient agreements). 
3.  Reforms of the budget process to curtail some Executive discretion (as seems to have been instrumented in the 
Mexican case), limiting the ability to perform bailouts. 
4.  Institutional reforms of intergovernmental relations (given that these federal transactions will inevitably involve 
“executive federalism” among the national government and provincial authorities, we want to improve the 
institutional environment for those transactions). 
5.  Reforms of the tax-sharing agreement to improve the Wicksellian connection between the taxes raised and the 
public goods consumed within each jurisdiction 
6.  Macro-fiscal rules to guide this transition towards a more cooperative (and more sustainable) fiscal stance, 
including a moving average mechanism to smooth out and make more foreseeable the flow of tax revenue 
received by the provinces.  
 
Achieving countercyclical fiscal policy is possible in Latin America. However, both country experience 
and the complexity of proposals call for superb political leadership as a requirement for achieving the reforms that 
could lead to improved fiscal management in Latin America.  
 
Improving Creditworthiness During Recessions 
 
Several recent proposals related to reducing volatility in Latin America call for better insurance 
against shocks. A specific proposal by Borensztein and Mauro (2002) related to this is 
converting a significant proportion of debt issued by Latin American countries to GDP-indexed 
bonds. The idea is that bonds would pay higher interest when GDP growth is high, and less 
during recessions. This would reduce the need for rolling over debt or adjusting spending during 
  30recessions. Furthermore, increases in (inflexible) primary spending would be limited during 
expansions, because part of the extra surplus would automatically be used to pay debt service. 
Therefore, it would limit the problem of lack of creditworthiness and reduce procyclicality of 
spending. The role of IFIs is key in this kind of proposal, because the markets for this type of 
security are still underdeveloped. (See Caballero, 2003) 
  Another way for IFIs to contribute to improve creditworthiness during recessions and 
limit higher spending during expansions is to make sure that loans are disbursed during 
recessions and not during booms.
30 Easterly (2000) shows that IFI programs actually contribute 
to reducing procyclicality in developing countries. He finds that the growth in poverty was lower 
during recessions in countries that were engaged in IMF and World Bank programs. 
Furthermore, government transfers were significantly above average during contractions in 
countries under adjustment lending, and significantly below average during expansions. This 
indicates that the provisions in IFI programs such as social safety nets could be mitigating the 
effects of recessions on pro-poor public spending, and thus reducing the impact of recessions on 
poverty. This should be applauded and expanded. In fact, some credit lines to developing 
countries could be made contingent on recessions, or even increases in poverty. Incentive 
problems in reporting would be limited, because governments are not keen on announcing 
increases in poverty. 
 
Summing Up 
In Table 3 we summarize the policy options presented above to reduce procyclicality of fiscal 
policy in Latin America. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
29 We borrow this expression from Stein and Tommasi (2002).  
30 However, further study is required on the potential moral hazard problems that this policy might create. 
  31Table 3. Summary of Policy Options for Reducing Procyclicality 




and other policies 
Increase size of government 
Insist on transparency 
and accountability 
Improve savings during 
good times 
Fiscal rules to reduce 
discretion and limit 
spending and debt during 
good times 
Fiscal stabilization funds 
Reform fiscal institutions 
Countercyclical lending 
Improve creditworthiness 




Contingent credit lines 
 
We have argued that a voluntary approach to fiscal rules and stabilization funds should be 
avoided, as the evidence shows that they are no panaceas. More research is needed regarding 
what works in different political and economic environments. The same applies for reform of 
budget institutions. Probably hierarchical and transparent procedures are a good thing, but we 
need more country-specific analysis on how to implement these broad ideas. In federal countries, 
it is clear that incentive problems with sub-national spending have to be dealt with. However, the 
cases studied by Webb, González and Rosenblatt (2002) seem to indicate that “easy” solutions 
such as stabilizing transfers do not necessarily work. On the bright side, there are some 
encouraging experiences in the region, such as the Fiscal Responsibility Law in Brazil, and the 
structural surplus rule in Chile.  
  In the long run, Latin American countries would likely benefit from a more developed 
welfare state, both through more macroeconomic stability and less risk from aggregate shocks by 
the population, and in particular the poor. A step in the right direction is for Central Banks and 
technical offices to actually start calculating the cyclical component of fiscal policy, as is 
currently done in Chile. However, the road in this direction is long. It will require “brilliant fiscal 
management” (Birdsall, 2002), more trust of citizens in government and more transparency and 
accountability. For instance, automatic stabilizers such as unemployment insurance in a context 
of low transparency and state capacity can be risky. It might be impossible to cut spending 
during booms if the government cannot control whether unemployment insurance beneficiaries 
are employed in the informal sector. 
  326. Conclusion: Towards Countercyclical Social Policy in Latin America 
 
Crises are common and recessions are deep in Latin America, and the poor and middle income 
brackets are negatively affected. The recent emphasis on improving safety nets championed by 
IFIs is well directed, and in many cases has proven helpful to improve the lot of the poor during 
recessions. 
However, the procyclical behavior of fiscal policy—apart from increasing economic 
volatility—is a constraint on the ability of Latin American governments to protect the poor 
during downturns. Efforts must be made to increase savings during expansions, to increase 
access to credit during recessions, and to increase the size of automatic stabilizers in the budget.  
We have shown that simplistic applications of general principles such as “make budget 
procedures more hierarchical,” or “implement fiscal rules to limit spending and deficits” do not 
necessarily result in better fiscal outcomes. A more detailed, country-specific analysis is required 
to match detailed proposals to specific political contexts. This type of analysis is in its early 
stages, but we believe that IFIs should move in this direction. 
Policymakers in the region seeking to contribute to protecting the poor will have to 
practice “brilliant” fiscal leadership, including efforts to improve fiscal transparency, educating 
the public about the importance of saving during expansions (improving cost-benefit analysis of 
budget programs, and audit and control institutions would help), and pushing for institutional 
reform that will contribute to improved fiscal management, among others. A clear, transparent, 
medium-term macrofiscal framework with which to evaluate annual fiscal policy would also be 
helpful.  For example, the EU countries are guided by the Maastricht criteria and the Stability 
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  40Appendix A. Methodology for Calculating the Cyclical Behavior of Fiscal 
Policy 
 
The Hodrick-Prescott Filter Methodology 
 
The first step in this work consists of the definition of the cycle for an economic variable. The 
methodology consists of adjusting a tendency to the evolution of the logarithm of the variable in 
analysis (i.e., GDP, social expenditures or total expenditures). The difference between the 
logarithm of the observed value and the estimated tendency yields the cyclical component. 
 
To obtain the tendency of a time series, the Hodrick-Prescott filter (1997) is frequently 
used. If the variable under study is yt and the tendency is defined as gt, proceed to minimize the 
expression [1] selecting gt. 
 
[1]   
{}




























The method consists of minimizing the variance of y around g, subject to the restrictions 
of penalization of the second differences of g. The penalization parameter λ , controls the form 
of the tendency. With λ  higher, the tendency will be smoother and result in more recurrent 
variations. A clear rule doesn't exist for the determination of the parameter λ , nevertheless the 
values usually used are: 
•  100 = λ  for annual data. 
•  1600 = λ  for quarterly data. 
•  14400 = λ  for monthly data. 
In this work we use  100 = λ , in accordance with the annual data.  
 
Calculating the difference between the original value of the variable’s logarithm, and the 
logarithmic tendency estimated by the Hodrick-Prescott filter, the cyclical component is 
obtained. 
 
The Procyclicality of Social Expenditures 
 
To show how the methodology works, in this section we describe the calculation of 
procyclicality for two countries: Argentina and United States. 
 
First Step: Logarithm of GDP and Social Expenditures per Capita 
 
The first step consists of calculating the logarithm of the variables to study. The results are 
presented in the following tables and figures. 
 
  41Table A1. Logarithm of Per Capita GDP, Argentina and United States 
Logarithm of GDP per capita
Year Argentina United States
1970 8.80               9.77                
1971 8.85               9.79                
1972 8.90               9.83                
1973 8.93               9.88                
1974 8.97               9.86                
1975 8.93               9.85                
1976 8.88               9.89                
1977 8.91               9.93                
1978 8.86               9.97                
1979 8.91               9.99                
1980 8.90               9.98                
1981 8.83               9.99                
1982 8.78               9.96                
1983 8.80               9.99                
1984 8.80               10.06              
1985 8.71               10.08              
1986 8.77               10.11              
1987 8.78               10.13              
1988 8.75               10.17              
1989 8.67               10.19              
1990 8.64               10.20              
1991 8.73               10.18              
1992 8.81               10.20              
1993 8.86               10.22              
1994 8.91               10.25              
1995 8.86               10.26              
1996 8.90               10.29              
1997 8.97               10.32              
1998 8.99               10.36              
1999 8.95               10.39              
2000 8.93               10.40              
2001 8.87               10.38              
2002 8.68               10.40              








Logarithm of GDP p/c Argentina
Year


















Logarithm of GDP p/c United States
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  42Table A2. Logarithm of Per Capita Social Expenditures, Argentina and United States 
Logarithm of Social Expenditures  p/c
Year Argentina United States
1970
1971
1972 7.42                 
1973 7.44                 
1974 7.49                 
1975 7.64                 
1976 7.68                 
1977 7.67                 
1978 7.70                 
1979 7.70                 
1980 6.97                7.79                 
1981 6.92                7.83                 
1982 6.56                7.85                 
1983 6.63                7.89                 
1984 6.76                7.87                 
1985 6.81                7.87                 
1986 7.01                7.88                 
1987 7.11                7.87                 
1988 6.96                7.89                 
1989 6.87                7.89                 
1990 6.96                7.91                 
1991 7.10                7.98                 
1992 7.19                8.06                 
1993 7.26                8.09                 
1994 7.34                8.12                 
1995 7.31                8.15                 
1996 7.30                8.15                 
1997 7.35                8.17                 
1998 7.38               
1999 7.41               
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  43Second Step: HP Filter 
 
Then we apply the HP filter to the variables in the logarithms to obtain the trend. Table A3 
presents the results for Gross Domestic Product per capita. 
 
Table A3. HP-Filtered GDP Trend 
 
Trend of GDP per capita (HP filter)
Year Argentina United States
1970 8.87               9.78                
1971 8.88               9.80                
1972 8.89               9.82                
1973 8.90               9.84                
1974 8.90               9.86                
1975 8.90               9.88                
1976 8.89               9.90                
1977 8.89               9.92                
1978 8.88               9.94                
1979 8.86               9.96                
1980 8.85               9.98                
1981 8.83               10.00              
1982 8.82               10.01              
1983 8.80               10.03              
1984 8.79               10.06              
1985 8.77               10.08              
1986 8.76               10.10              
1987 8.76               10.12              
1988 8.76               10.14              
1989 8.76               10.16              
1990 8.77               10.18              
1991 8.79               10.20              
1992 8.81               10.22              
1993 8.83               10.24              
1994 8.85               10.26              
1995 8.87               10.28              
1996 8.88               10.30              
1997 8.89               10.32              
1998 8.88               10.34              
1999 8.88               10.36              
2000 8.86               10.38              
2001 8.84               10.39              
2002 8.82               10.41              
2003 8.79               10.43              
Trend of GDP p/c Argentina
Year
 lGDP_pc  trend_GDP_pc











Trend of GDP p/c United States
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  44Table A4 presents the results for Social Expenditures per capita. 
 
Table A4. HP-Filtered Social Expenditures Trend 
Trend of Social Expenditures (HP filter)
Year Argentina United States
1970
1971
1972 7.45                 
1973 7.49                 
1974 7.54                 
1975 7.58                 
1976 7.62                 
1977 7.66                 
1978 7.70                 
1979 7.73                 
1980 6.77                7.76                 
1981 6.78                7.79                 
1982 6.79                7.82                 
1983 6.81                7.84                 
1984 6.84                7.85                 
1985 6.87                7.87                 
1986 6.90                7.89                 
1987 6.94                7.91                 
1988 6.97                7.92                 
1989 7.02                7.95                 
1990 7.06                7.97                 
1991 7.10                8.00                 
1992 7.15                8.03                 
1993 7.20                8.06                 
1994 7.24                8.09                 
1995 7.28                8.12                 
1996 7.31                8.15                 
1997 7.34                8.18                 
1998 7.38               
1999 7.41               




Trend of Social Expenditures United States
Year
 lGPC_social  trend_GPC_social











Trend of Social Expenditures Argentina
Year
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  45Third Step: Cyclical Component 
 
Now we can calculate the cyclical component of the time series, calculated as the difference 
between the observed value and the estimated trend in the second step. In the following table and 
figures we present the relationship between the cyclical component of GDP and Social 
Expenditures. 
 
Table A5. GDP and Social Expenditure Cycles 
Cycle of GDP and Social Expenditures per capita (observed-trend)
Year
GDP Social Exp. GDP Social Exp.
1970 -0.08 -0.01
1971 -0.03 -0.01
1972 0.01 0.01 -0.02
1973 0.04 0.04 -0.05
1974 0.07 0.00 -0.04
1975 0.03 -0.03 0.06
1976 -0.02 -0.01 0.06
1977 0.02 0.01 0.00
1978 -0.02 0.03 0.00
1979 0.05 0.03 -0.03
1980 0.05 0.20 0.00 0.02
1981 -0.01 0.14 0.00 0.04
1982 -0.04 -0.23 -0.05 0.03
1983 0.00 -0.18 -0.04 0.06
1984 0.02 -0.08 0.00 0.01
1985 -0.06 -0.05 0.01 0.00
1986 0.01 0.11 0.01 -0.01
1987 0.02 0.17 0.01 -0.03
1988 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.04
1989 -0.10 -0.14 0.03 -0.06
1990 -0.14 -0.10 0.02 -0.06
1991 -0.06 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
1992 0.00 0.04 -0.02 0.03
1993 0.03 0.07 -0.02 0.03
1994 0.05 0.10 -0.01 0.03
1995 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.03
1996 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
1997 0.08 0.00 0.01 -0.01
1998 0.11 0.01 0.02
1999 0.07 0.00 0.03





Cycles of GDP and Social Expenditures United States
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 Cycle p/c GDP  Cycle p/c Social Expenditures







Cycles of GDP and Social Expenditures Argentina
Year
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The figures present a preliminary conclusion about the cyclical behavior of the social 
expenditures. We can see procyclical behavior in Argentina, in contrast with countercyclical 
behavior in the case of the United States. 
 
 
Fourth Step: Correlation between Cycles 
 
Finally, we calculate the correlation between the GDP and social expenditure cycles to establish 
the degree of procyclicality. 
 
In this case, the correlation values are: 0.63 in Argentina and -0.75 in the United States. 
The results are consistent with the figures in the previous section. 
 
  46Results in Latin American Countries 
 
The panels of the following figure present the results for Latin American countries for which 
data are available.  The correlations are reported in the tables in the text. 
 
Figure A1.  Cyclicality of GDP and Social Expenditure in Selected Countries 
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  47Appendix B.  Description of Data and Sources 
 
The source of the data for these calculations is: 
•  World Economic Outlook Database (International Monetary Fund), September 2002. 
Data:  
o  Real Gross Domestic Product, Constant Prices (billions of local currency 
units). 
o  Gross Domestic Product, Current Prices (billions of local currency units). 
o  Gross Domestic Product, Current Prices (billions of U.S. dollars). 
o  Per Capita Gross Domestic Product, Constant Prices (local currency per 
person). 
•  Government Financial Statistics (International Monetary Fund. Data: 
o  Total expenditures of public sector. 
o  Expenditures of education, health, social security and welfare, housing and 
community amenities. 
Period: Variables of Gross Domestic Product: 1970-2002. Expenditures: 1972-1997. 
 
Table B1.  Regression Results Reported in Section 3 
Dependent Variable: Cyclical Correlation of Social Expenditure 
 








Expenditure / GDP  0.004 
(1.29) 




Latin America dummy  0.057 
(0.49) 
OECD dummy  0.104 
(0.58) 
N 59 




  48Appendix C.  Recent Experience with Fiscal Rules in Latin America 
 
This appendix describes some salient examples of recent fiscal rules implemented in Latin 
America with various degrees of success. The cases of Argentina, Brazil and Colombia draw 




The Convertibility Plan adopted at the beginning of the 1990s constrained monetary and 
exchange rate policies. Fiscal pressures have mounted due to the impact of international financial 
crisis (Tequila effect, Russian and Asian crises) in the 1990s, and a controversial system of 
transfers to sub-national governments. The economy was also hit by the Brazilian devaluation in 
1998. During that decade, the fiscal balance only showed a surplus in 1994, despite a strong 
economic performance during the first half of the 1990s. Sub-national governments posted a 
growing deficit of 1.5 percent of GDP in 1999 and the fiscal deficit exceeded US$7 billion. 
 
Faced with a deteriorating budget balance and growing debt payments, the Argentine 
Congress approved a Fiscal Solvency Law (Ley de Solvencia Fiscal) in September 1999 that 
contains only eleven articles. Apart from establishing numerical limits for the central 
government’s fiscal deficit, it also limited the growth of expenditures. Furthermore, the law 
stipulated the adoption of pluriannual budgeting (a three-year budget), the creation of a Counter-
cyclical Fiscal Fund, and the implementation of transparency measures to increase the 
availability of information regarding the state of public finances. Although the law did not 




  In terms of counter-cyclical policy, the law created a Fiscal Counter-Cyclical Fund 
managed by the Ministry of Economy. The sources of this fund consist primarily of preset 
Treasury contributions, fiscal surpluses and 50 percent of the proceeds of the concession 
programs. Once the Fund reaches the equivalent of 3 percent of GDP, it can be used to cancel 
external debt. 
 
Regarding the limits on budget deficits, the Law established that fiscal balance had to be 
reached no later than 2003, and it set nominal ceilings for the non-financial public sector deficit 
between 1999 and 2002. The Fiscal Solvency Law was modified by the 2001 Budgetary Law, 
which relaxed the deficit ceilings, and extended the date at which budget balance should be 
achieved until 2005. Table C1 shows the limits imposed by the Fiscal Solvency Law and its 
modification, together with the actual budget outcomes between 1999 and 2001. Contrary to the 




                                                           
31 The exclusion of limits on sub-national governments was a fundamental weakness of the rule. In a country with a 
federal fiscal system like the one in Argentina, fiscal rules would only make sense if they encompass all relevant  
Table C1. Compliance with the Fiscal Solvency Law 
 
Limits (as % of GDP) 






1999 1.9%    3.1% 
2000 1.1%    2.5% 
2001 0.5%  2.5%  3.3% 
2002 0.3%  2%  1.9% 
2003 0%  1.3%   
2004 0%  0.9%   
2005 0%  0%   
               Source: Braun and Tommasi (2002) 
 
  At the sub-national level, several governments followed the national example and passed 
fiscal solvency rules. These rules differ across provinces in some of their characteristics, as well 
as in the degree to which they have been followed. Table C2 summarizes the main characteristics 
of the existing sub-national rules.  
 
Table C2. Main Characteristics of Sub-National Fiscal Rules in Argentina 
 
Explicit Limits on 













GCBA NO               
Buenos 
Aires 
NO              
Catamarca YES 12/00  Yes          Yes 
Cordoba YES  03/00  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes   
Corrientes NO               
Chaco YES  05/00  Yes  Yes    Yes     
Chubut YES    - Yes Yes Yes  Yes     
Entre Rios  NO               
Formosa YES  12/99  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Jujuy NO              
La Pampa  NO               
La Rioja  NO               
Mendoza YES  01/00  Yes        Yes   
Misiones YES  05/00  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes 
Neuquen YES  -    Yes    Yes       
Río Negro  YES  01/01  Yes  Yes    Yes  Yes  Yes 
Salta YES  05/99  Yes  Yes  Yes       
San Juan  YES  01/01  Yes  Yes  Yes       
                                                                                                                                                                                           
governmental levels. Otherwise, they would simply be non-binding. It would be like telling a person that they can 
only spend $500 a month using their left hand.  
32 Values are estimated, because the Law establishes nominal ceilings for the deficit, not for the deficit as percentage 
of GDP. 
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San Luis  YES  08/99    Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes 
Santa Cruz  NO               
Santa Fe  NO               
Santiago 
Del Estero 
NO              
Tucuman YES  09/99  Yes    Yes  Yes     
Tierra del 
Fuego 
YES 08/00  Yes  Yes         
National 
Govt.  
YES 09/99  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Source: Braun and Tommasi (2002). 
 
  These rules include several of the characteristics favored by the recent literature on fiscal 
rules, such as clear limits on government debt and requirements regarding the timely and 
accurate publication of fiscal information. However, compliance with these laws in terms of debt 
and deficit performance has been uneven. Table C3 shows the deficit and expenditure targets 
allowed by law in each province and the actual outcomes for the year 2000. Only 5 out of 11 
provinces that imposed a hard budget constraint actually fulfilled their commitment. Out of the 
five that complied with the law, two of these, Cordoba and Tucuman, had been achieving the 
objective stated in the law for several years, so the law appears more like a reflection of pre-
existing underlying political agreements. With respect to limits on expenditure, three out of eight 
provinces that imposed limits did not comply with them in the year 2000.  
 
 
Table C3. Degree of Compliance with Provincial Solvency 
and Fiscal Responsibility Laws 
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For year 2000: the 
deficit must be less than 
100 millions. Then it 















For year 2000, the 
primary surplus must be 
equal to 50% of public 
debt interest of that 
year. 
The surplus was 
70% of public debt 
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must be held constant. 
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For Year 2000: the 
deficit must be less than 
the debt amortization of 
this year. 
134 million of 
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National Resources 
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3% of total revenue at 
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semester of 20001 
the primary surplus 
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Expenditures were 
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result must be zero. 
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Fiscal equilibrium  The fiscal deficit 
was 69 million 
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the Current revenue 
growth. If Current 
revenue decreases, the 
Current Expenditure 
must be held constant. 
The Current 
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The fiscal deficit must 
be equal to the 
budgeted. 
9 million surplus 





No    
Source: Braun and Tommasi (2002). 
 
 
  The tradition of not respecting rules goes beyond these recent cases.  Several provincial 
constitutions contain limits on public debt. In fact, 16 of 24 provinces have constitutional limits 
regarding the ratio between debt service and total revenue. These limits range between 20 and 25 
percent of total revenue. However, in 2000, only 10 of the 16 provinces complied with those 
limits, with preliminary results for 2001 being much worse (see Table C4). 
 
 
Table C4. Compliance with Constitutional Debt-Service Rule (Argentine provinces) 
 





G.C.B.A. No  limit  3% 
Buenos Aires  No limit  3% 
Catamarca (a)  20%  24% 
Córdoba (b)  20%  13% 
Corrientes   25%  41% 
Chaco 25%  14% 
Chubut No  limit  12% 
Entre Ríos  25%  27% 
Formosa 25% 39% 
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Jujuy 20%  31% 
La Pampa  25%  1% 
La Rioja  (b)   25%  6% 
Mendoza No  limit  14% 
Misiones   25%  10% 
Neuquén   No limit  14% 
Río Negro  25%  26% 
Salta   25%  13% 
    
San Juan   No limit  12% 
San Luis  (b)  25%  0% 
Santa Cruz   No limit  2% 
Santa Fe   25%  5% 
Sgo del Estero  25%  6% 
Tucumán No  limit  22% 
Tierra del Fuego  25%  19% 
Source: Braun and Tommasi (2002). 
(a)  Debt service should not be higher than 20 per- 
       cent of the five-year average. 
(b)  Based on the lowest revenue within the past 
       three years. 
 
  Thus, Argentina exhibits both long-standing and recent fiscal rules, many approved 
following international best practices, which have been broken. Several provinces did not 
comply with their commitments in the face of declining tax revenues, signaling to creditors the 
inability to maintain fiscal discipline and thus contributing to Argentina’s overall fiscal crisis. 
Inadequate institutional design contributed to the inability of rules to guarantee fiscal 
sustainability.  
 
Figure C1. Current GDP and Fiscal Ratios for Argentina 














































GDP Primary Def  / GDP Debt / GDP
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Argentine Ministry of Economy. 
  54Brazil 
 
In the 1980s, inconsistent fiscal and monetary management and coordination, despite the start of 
some economic reforms, caused a volatile environment and several crises. The 1988 Constitution 
in Brazil mandated a large increase in tax sharing. However, Congress rejected a proposal for 
matching decentralization of expenditure responsibilities. Finally, during the 1990s expenditure 
decentralization did increase, and at the same time, the federal government increased tax rates on 
those taxes it was not mandated to share with the states. Therefore, the federal government 
managed to keep a roughly constant level of deficit as a share of GDP, whereas fiscal 
mismanagement at the state level led to excessive state deficits and growing debt. There were 
several state debt crises during the 1990s; on several occasions the federal government bailed the 
states out, furthering the incentives for fiscal laxity at the local level. 
 
The Real Plan in 1994 started to attack the fiscal front, and the reduction in inflation 
posed a new challenge to fiscal policy since it was no longer possible to use the inflation tax as a 
source of financing. The decrease in the availability of external capital inflows due to 
international crises, together with growing difficulties in sub-national governments’ finances, 
exerted increasing pressure on Brazilian fiscal policy during the second half of the 1990s.  
 
In 1998, a new round of rescheduling was accompanied by attempts at hardening state 
budget constraints. Fiscal targets (minimum primary surpluses) were placed in budgetary laws. 
Senate approval was imposed as a requirement for all sub-national government borrowing 
operations, and the issue of new bonds was prohibited, as was borrowing from state-owned 
banks. These rules limiting debt were not fully effective. Therefore, the government started to 
draft a bill to create a Fiscal Responsibility Law in order to promote a new regime. In December 
1998, the bill was made available for public scrutiny and consultation over the Internet, and it 
was officially sent to Congress in April 1999. The bill was finally approved in May 2000, with 
full majority support in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies, which was required because of 
its being a Supplementary Law.
33 
 
The Brazilian Fiscal Responsibility Law applies to the three levels of governments and 






                                                          
The annual Budgetary Directives Law must include annual targets for 
revenues, expenditures and public debt for the current and for the two 
subsequent years and an evaluation of compliance with the previous year’s 
targets on accrual basis.  
Tax exemptions or benefits, as well as new expenditure items, must be 
included in the budget law. 
Personnel expenditures, excluding severance payments and voluntary 
separation incentives, cannot exceed certain percentages of net current 
revenues for each government level. Exceeding the limits creates restrictions 
 
33 Supplementary Laws cannot be changed by an ordinary law (such as the budget law, for instance) or a provisional 
measure. 
  55to personnel management, plus the adoption of a plan to eliminate that excess 
in the next eight months.  
The Federal Senate will establish debt limits. The ratio of net debt to current 
revenue should reach a target of 1.0 over 15 years. The golden rule is: no debt 






Central Bank lending is prohibited. In general, no lending is allowed between 
different levels of governments.  
All instruments of fiscal management, including plan, budgets and reports, 
must be widely disclosed. Different reports about budget execution and fiscal 
management must be prepared. 
Stricter limitations for the final year in office for the politicians, in an effort to 
limit the political business cycle.  
A state that does not comply with the law may be subject to limits on new 
credit operations, transfers and guarantees from the central government. At the 
individual level, a government official can lose her position, lose the right to 
hold a public sector position for 5 years, and even be arrested and fined.   
 
Figure C2. Current GDP and Fiscal Ratios for Brazil 






























GDP Tax Revenues / GDP Expenditures / GDP
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on IMF. 
 
The preliminary results are encouraging. However, it is too early to come to a conclusion 
about the long-term effects on public finances in Brazil. It has not yet been tested by time, and 




In 1985 the government created the Chilean Copper Fund to help stabilize fiscal revenues from 
the volatility of copper receipts. At the beginning of the new democratic period, during a major 
boom in copper prices, the fund especially helped contain pressures for increased public 
spending by keeping net surpluses out of sight and out of reach of the normal discretionary 
budget process. It also tied the hands of the Executive and raised the cost of appropriating 
savings for additional expenditures, since it would have required a change in the law.  Thanks to 
this policy, government expenditures have not closely tracked revenue availability. Accumulated 
deposits into the fund reached their peak in 1997, amounting to US$ 3.9 billion.  
 
  56The fund’s saving-spending rules are symmetric and based on a long-term copper 
reference price. Nevertheless, because the fund does not include an automatic rule for 
divestitures, it may play a limited role in helping to execute counter-cyclical policies in 
downturns, as happened in 1999. At that time the government found that previous surpluses and 
the savings in the CSF were not enough to play a role in counter-cyclical fiscal policy.  
 
After the structural balance showed a deficit for the first time in ten years, in 1999, the 
government decided to implement a new approach to fiscal policy. At that time a new fiscal rule 
based on structural surpluses of 1 percent of GDP was introduced to reaffirm and intensify 
Chile’s commitment to fiscal responsibility. Chile’s new fiscal policy approach represents not an 
emergency effort to restore fiscal policy credibility where there was none before, but to set a sign 
of how fiscal policy will be conducted over a medium-term horizon.  
 
The Chilean approach is not a fiscal rule in the strictest sense, as it is not imposed by law. 
Instead, it is a self-imposed measure by the present government to guide fiscal policy from 2001 
to 2005. Nevertheless, this initiative is perceived as highly credible because of Chile’s good track 
record of fiscal policy.  
 
The calculation of the structural surplus in Chile follows the IMF and OECD 
methodology modified to capture some peculiarities of the Chilean economy. It is estimated by 
removing the effects of cycle variations in copper prices, given the importance of copper 
revenues for public finances, and the economic cycles in revenues but not in expenditures.  
 
The fiscal rule in Chile only applies to the central government. The quasi-fiscal deficit of 
the central bank, and flows from public enterprises, the military sector and municipalities are 
excluded from the new structural balance. However, this does not necessarily imply a weakening 
of the search for fiscal discipline, since they are not ignored from policy considerations.  
 
This rule is supposed to enable Chile to generate large surpluses in good times and thus 
avoid a procyclical bias in fiscal policy, which was common in the past. Talvi and Végh (2000) 
and Bergoeing and Soto (2000) provide estimates of procyclicality before the introduction of the 
fiscal rule.  
 
This rule works well if structural revenues are estimated correctly. If these are 
overestimated systematically a potential deficit bias in the actual balance is introduced. Another 
weak point of the fiscal rule is that public sector borrowing requirements need to be met on the 
basis of the actual and not structural balance. Therefore, a financing problem might arise if, in 
spite of a structural surplus, a country is running subsequent actual deficits. In emerging 
economies, deficits and debt sustainability play an important role when evaluating country risk.     
 
  57Figure C3. Current GDP and Fiscal Ratios, Chile 
(national government, millions of national currency) 









































GDP Revenues / GDP Expenditures / GDP
Source: Authors’ calculations based on IMF. 
 
As Chile’s new fiscal rule is a structural surplus rule and not a structural balance rule, it is 
difficult to assess potential implications on the size/composition of future public or social 
expenditures. However, it is possible that the fiscal rule helps smooth public and social 
expenditures over the cycle. As in the case of Brazil, Chile’s new fiscal rule has not yet been 




Colombia has traditionally been a centralist, unitary state, and its departments and municipalities 
have less autonomy than Brazilian states or Argentine provinces. However, political 
decentralization increased in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Mayors started to be directly elected 
in 1986, and governors in 1991.  
 
Consistent with the centralist tradition, sub-national borrowing in Colombia in the 1980s 
and before was uncommon, and required approval by the Ministry of Finance. However, in the 
late 1980s and 1990s the trend towards political decentralization was accompanied by more 
freedom for domestic borrowing. In particular, there was no effective ex ante control of cash 
advances from banks, and sub-national debt with the banking sector rose from 2.6 percent of 
GDP in 1991 to 4.6 percent in 1997.
34  
 
As a way to increase control over sub-national debt by the central government, the so-
called Traffic Light Law was passed in 1997. This law brought into effect a rating system for 
territorial governments, based on the ratios of interest to operational savings and of debt to 
current revenues. Highly indebted local governments (red light) were prohibited from borrowing, 
and intermediate cases (yellow light) were required to obtain permission from the Ministry of 
Finance. In this way, the central government would be able to limit the growth of sub-national 
debt. 
 
  However, the indebtedness law has not been fully effective. According to Echavarría, 
Renteria and Steiner (2000), some governments with a red light rating have obtained new 
  58
                                                           
34 For further details, see Dillinger, Perry and Webb (2001). financing without permission of the Ministry of Finance. “Out of 21 departments that required 
permission for new loans in 1997, 10 received new credit without permission from the Ministry 
[…] In order to be able to violate the law, departments presented defective financial information, 
and the financial institutions made superficial analysis of it. In addition, the Ministry of Finance 
gave its authorization in cases where it should have denied it” (Echevarría, Renteria and Steiner, 
2000, p. 9).  Furthermore, as described by Vice-Minister Catalina Crane, while there was the 
expectation that departments would transit from yellow to green, they have transited from yellow 
to red. 
 
The importance of bank lending as a source of financing for sub-national governments in 
Colombia makes bank regulation an alternative way to control sub-national borrowing. The 
Superintendency of Banks has altered its requirements regarding provisions against 
nonperforming territorial loans. After the bank borrowing expanded in 1993-1994, the 
Superintendency established that any sub-national loan with maturity of over a year had to be 
considered risky and consequently should require some provisioning. These regulations were 
relaxed again in 1996, leading to two years of high borrowing. Starting in 1999, the debt of any 
territory with a red rating in the traffic-light law system must be fully provisioned, increasing the 
cost of those loans for banks. This combination may make the traffic-light law more effective. 
 
The Colombian Coffee Fund was instituted with the objective of permitting some 
stabilization in the incomes of coffee growers along the cycle of international prices. 
Nevertheless, it also had, as a side effect, significant fiscal stabilization properties that became a 
major objective of government policy in the 1980s and 1990s. As a para-fiscal institution, the 
Coffee Fund was not included in the budget and was kept out of the normal fiscal process, so 
surpluses were from political eyes. The Fund lost fiscal importance during the 1990s as coffee 
became less important from a fiscal point of view, and oil largely took its place.  
 
Therefore, in 1995 the Colombian Oil Stabilization Fund (OSF) was instituted. It uses 
automatic rules for both savings and withdrawals: it requires saving excess revenues over past 
moving averages, and permits withdrawals up to the shortfalls of actual revenues from such 
previous averages. The Fund was designed to tie the hands of authorities and hide from political 
view the expected surpluses during the impeding increase of oil production and revenues from 
new discoveries, as excess revenues deposited in the Fund are not included in the budget. The 
discussion and enactment of the Fund were well before the increase in revenues began to flow in. 
This approach, together with the adoption of symmetrical rules for National and sub-national 
governments, facilitates the political consensus. Although the OSF accumulated significant 
reserves, it turned out to be less important than expected and did not prevent an increase in 
public expenditures during the boom in non-oil tax revenues (1991-96), which led to a 
significant increase in the deficit during the subsequent downturn (1996-99).  
 
Since 1995, fiscal balances have been negative and in 1999 the deficit exceeded 6% of 
the GDP. Multilateral organizations provided fast disbursements and the country had to negotiate 
a stand-by agreement with the IMF. As part of the necessary reforms, in 2000 Colombia passed 
  59Law 617, the so-called Sub-National Fiscal Responsibility Law. The main features of the 96 
articles are the following:
35 
 
i)  Primary current expenditure must be exclusively financed by non-earmarked 
current revenues, and should not exceed a fixed percentage, depending on the 
state or municipal category.  
ii)  Expenditure for state legislatures is limited.  
iii)  Across-the-board cuts should be put in place whenever effective non-
earmarked current revenues are lower than budgeted, and state and municipal 
central administrations are not allowed to make transfers to their public 
entities. 
iv)  There are strict limits to municipality creation. Proven non-viable 
municipalities have to merge. 
v)  When sub-national governments do not comply with the limits imposed by the 
Law, they have to adopt a fiscal rescue program to regain viability within the 
next two years. 
vi) To promote transparency, there is an extensive list of characteristics and 





Figure C4. Current GDP and Fiscal Ratios, Colombia 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on IMF. 
 
  It is also still too early to tell whether the law brings about a structural change in fiscal 
outcomes, but the provisions seem to be a move in the right direction. The authorities are also 
working on a fiscal responsibility law for central government finances. The project has been 
drafted, but it seems that there is still no consensus, particularly on the issue of sanctions and 
penalties, since they are perceived as subject to political interference and manipulation. 
 
 
35 For further details see Oliva (2001). 
  60Peru 
 
During most of the 1990s, the main objective of fiscal policy was to generate primary surpluses 
in order to afford interest payments of non-financial public sector debt. Between 1991 and 1996 
these interest payments amounted, on average, to 4 percent of the GDP, with average primary 
surpluses of 1.2 percent and an average global deficit of 2.8 percent. The Asian crisis in 1997 
and the Russian crisis of 1998 both hit the Peruvian economy, provoking a recession and causing 
the country’s fiscal position to weaken. At the end of this decade, fiscal balances showed both an 
apparent ceiling for revenue collection and increasing public expenditures.       
 
  By the end of 1999, Congress approved a Prudence and Transparency Law with the goal 
of establishing guidelines to improve public finance management in order to contribute to 
economic stability. The passage of this Law was a compromise established in a Sector Loan 
backed by the Inter-American Development Bank and supported by other multilateral 
organizations. Fiscal policy recovered its procyclical characteristic but this time in legal terms. 
The key aspects of this law are the following: 
 
•  The Ministry of Economy and Finance will prepare and publish a Multi-
annual Macroeconomic Framework, which will contain macroeconomic 
projections for the next three years, including macroeconomic assumptions, 
fiscal revenues and expenditures, projected public investment, and public debt 
stock and profile. 
•  The consolidated public sector deficit cannot exceed 1 percent of GDP.  
•  The increase in the real general government non-financial public expenditures 
cannot surpass the 2% rate.  
•  Public debt cannot increase more than the deficit adjusted by several factors, 
such as exchange variations and pension “recognition bonds.”  
•  In election years, there are some limits to the path of non-financial public 
expenditures and fiscal deficit. 
•  The congress has the freedom to suspend, for the fiscal year, any of the 
numeric rules in cases of national emergency or international crisis, without 
explicitly defining those events. The congress can also increase the fiscal 
deficit to a maximum of 2 percent of GDP if there is evidence of recession.  
•  Fiscal Stabilization Fund is established, managed by the Ministry of Economy 
and Finance. Its resources come from any ordinary revenues in excess of 0.3 
percent of GDP with respect to their last three-year average, adjusted by tax 
policy changes. In addition, the Fund receives 75 percent of privatization 
revenues and 50 percent of concession proceeds. Fund resources will be used 
when ordinary revenues are 0.3 percent of GDP less than the adjusted three-
year average and in the case of the exceptions mentioned above. 
 
 
  61Figure C.5. Current GDP and Fiscal Ratios, Peru 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on IMF. 
 
 
It is surprising that the Prudence and Transparency Law passed by the Congress in 1999 
did not considered the past behavior of fiscal variables during booms, nor did it predict the 
performance of the Peruvian economy for the next few years. The numeric and exception rules 
were completely impossible to comply with during downturns. In 2000, the non-financial public 
sector deficit reached 3.2 percent of the GDP, and 2.5 percent in 2001. These deficits completely 
violated the exception rule that set a maximum 2 percent deficit during recessions. This limit 
appears unreasonable, since interest payments amount on average to 2 percent of GDP.          
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